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EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA WARNINGS
Abstract

Social media allows individuals to share, receive and engage with information and content on an
international scale, often with other likeminded individuals and relatively few restrictions (Carr
& Hayes, 2015). However, with this access comes the likelihood of engaging with and

disseminating misinformation (Allcott et al., 2019), a form of information that may seem true
initially but is later revealed as false (Cook et al., 2015). Misinformation is often disseminated by
those whose political ideology matches that of the misinformation (Kahan, 2017; Kahan, 2013).
The current study aims to expand on the extant literature to examine how misinformation
warnings impact memory recall for self-generated descriptions of photographed events. Two
hundred sixteen college-age students were recruited to participate in the current online study via
SONA, where they completed stereotype items for Trump supporters and Republicans, and
created Tweets for images depicting MAGA gatherings. Participants received immediate
feedback consisting of a warning (“Rated False” or “Disputed”) or no warning, and the option to
follow a link to the source of the image. Results demonstrate no effect of misinformation
warnings on memory recall for self-generated descriptions. The “Rated False” misinformation
warning resulted in decreased warmth stereotype scores for Republicans only.
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Examining the effectiveness of misinformation warnings to alter stereotypes for public
figures and memories for public events
Social media provides individuals with the ability to “cross” international boundaries,
enabling them to share, post, and receive information on a global scale (Carr & Hayes, 2015).

Users can join groups with like-minded individuals, and can interact with each other’s lives or
through asynchronous actions such as commenting, reposting, etc. However, social media
platforms also increase one’s risk of coming into contact with misinformation. The spread of
misinformation on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter increased from 2015 to 2017 (Allcott
et al., 2019). However, the number of engagements with fake news on Facebook (approximately
60 million engagements) was still much higher than Twitter (approximate five million shares).
Individuals may share misinformation for many reasons. For example, individuals may share
misinformation because they a) trust the platform and, in turn, not verify the information (Talwar
et al., 2019); b) have a fear of missing out (FOMO) which may drive gossiping (Talwar et al.,
2019); c) have social media fatigue and, as a result, share misinformation without taking the time
to authenticate information (Talwar et al., 2019); and d) share the same ideological beliefs as the
misinformation (Lawson & Kakkar, 2021).
In an effort to combat these factors leading to the acceptance and sharing of
misinformation, social media platforms have begun utilizing misinformation warnings and fact-

check alerts (Nekmat, 2020). Research on the effect of these misinformation warnings has
provided mixed results. Some of the existing literature reports that the misinformation warnings,
“Disputed” and “Rated False”, can lower the perceived accuracy of an article when

accompanying an article headline (Clayton et al., 2019), while other research mirroring
Facebook’s fake news flag (“Disputed by 3rd Party Fact-Checkers”) demonstrated that the
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presence of a fake news flag did not impact participants’ beliefs in the misinformation (Moravec

et al., 2018). However, research surrounding the fact-check alert “Disputed by fact-checkers” has
found that this alert can deter individuals from sharing misinformation on social media platforms
(Nekmat, 2020). Misinformation warnings have also been used to reverse stereotypic distortion

effects on memory. Blank et al. (2019) created two dating profiles with the two most
stereotypical occupations, stereotypical content associated with these occupations, and selfdescriptions of the male characters. During the memory test at Session 2, post-warnings of
misinformation were presented disclosing the occupations had been incorrect. These warnings
reduced participants’ inclusion of stereotype-related material in their recall. One use for
misinformation warnings on social media platforms may then be to prompt individuals to draw
less from stereotypes when engaging and interacting with members of both in- and out-groups.
Currently, the extant literature regarding the effects of misinformation warnings uses article
headlines, news pages, and vignettes to determine whether the warning can alter participants’
perceptions of accuracy, willingness to share that information, as well as their memory recall
through references of the presented articles and vignettes. However, it remains unclear whether
this translates to partisan stereotypes, and whether misinformation warnings seen on social media
platforms (i.e., “Rated False” and “Disputed” warnings from Facebook and Twitter) will have
the same effect of decreasing stereotypic judgements after their presentation.

The current research seeks to fill in some of the gaps in the existing literature in regards
to the effects of misinformation warnings on altering participants’ self-generated descriptions
given the extant literature focuses primarily on presenting headlines and articles, but not self-

generated social media posts. Additionally, the present study examined whether such warnings
would similarly alter stereotypes held for out-group members. Thus, the present study examined
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whether a majority Democratic sample will demonstrate changes in their descriptions of a

particular image following the presentation of a misinformation warning (or not). Additionally,
this study examined whether individuals’ stereotypic beliefs of their out-group or in-group will
change after exposure to a misinformation warning. To this end, I will first discuss the literature

focusing on social media, misinformation, the use of misinformation warnings, and stereotypes. I
then introduce the present study.
Social Media
Social media platforms allow users to share, receive, and engage in information and other
content with various audiences (Carr & Hayes, 2015). Present day social media platforms, such
as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram, are classified as mass-personal communication
channels, where individual users can communicate and engage with audiences. According to data
collected from a large-scale phone survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, in 2021, 81
percent of 1,502 U.S. adults said they used YouTube, and 69 percent said they use Facebook,
while platforms such as Instagram and Twitter were used by 40 percent and 23 percent
respectively (Auxier & Anderson, 2021). On an even larger scale, social media platforms are
used by around four billion people (Rathje et al., 2021).
Users on social media platforms can share and receive information from one another,
with recent studies examining what makes individuals more likely to share personal information.

Of four motivations examined – self purposes, directive purposes, social reasons, and therapeutic
reasons – Stone et al. (2022) found the primary motivation behind adults posting and sharing
personal information was for social reasons, which encapsulates an individual’s desire to keep in

touch with friends and family. Additionally, individual characteristics, such as extraversion and
self-esteem may influence the reasons behind sharing information on social media. Whether
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posting or engaging with posts, due to how much information is shared daily, misinformation has

become a pervasive form of information shared on social media, meaning social media users
may interact with misinformation as well (Cook et al., 2015).
Misinformation
Misinformation is a form of information that may be presented as true initially, but
subsequently revealed to be false (Cook et al., 2015). There are multiple characteristics of and
aspects regarding misinformation that make this form of communication potentially damaging:
individuals may form false beliefs from misinformation, have a strong conviction of said
misinformation and, in turn, the misinformation becomes more difficult to correct or retract
(Cook et al., 2015). Misinformation has also demonstrated an impact on memory, causing
participants to remember details suggested through misinformation as opposed to the truth,
something that can happen when an extensive amount of time or cognitive capacity went into
deliberating the truthfulness of the misinformation (Loftus, 2005). Additionally, misinformation
has the potential to replace or negate factual information, causing individuals to stop believing in
a fact when presented with another fact and related misinformation (van der Linden et al., 2017).
Whether or not an individual chooses to believe, accept, or share misinformation may
depend on multiple factors, including predominating social norms and acceptance within a
group, where individuals may be more inclined to accept misinformation as truth if their group

supports it (Del Vicario et al., 2015; Kahan, 2013). Another factor includes congruency with an
individual’s worldviews or ideological beliefs, which can be demonstrated through confirmation
bias, a preference to seek and accept information that aligns with one’s beliefs (Cook et al.,

2015; Kahan, 2013; Nickerson, 1998). An individual’s ideology may affect their belief in
misinformation, such that an individual’s ideological beliefs may negatively impact his or her
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ability to reason, leading them to believe in misinformation and rate it as more accurate when it

aligns with their beliefs, even after it has been retracted and stated as false (Bago et al., 2020;
Kahan, 2013; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The credibility of information, whether it is actually
true or false, will typically be accepted by individuals if it aligns with their beliefs (Lazer et al.,

2018). The likelihood of verifying whether that information is in fact true is increased when it is
believed to be true and congruent with preexisting beliefs, demonstrating the existence of
confirmation bias (Edgerly et al., 2020). Additionally, individuals who are uncertain about a
headline’s veracity demonstrate the least intent to verify whether it is true or false. If the
information is incongruent with beliefs or comes from a low credibility source, an individual
might not use it as supportive in an argument. With the increasing opportunities for encountering
and engaging with misinformation, research has turned to the use of misinformation warnings for
both offline, and more recently, online misinformation.
Misinformation Warnings
For years researchers have examined the impact of warnings as a means of mitigating the
spread of misinformation offline. Using a warning to inform people that they may be exposed to
misinformation in the future, prior to the initial exposure of misinformation, has been shown to
reduce beliefs in misinformation (Loftus, 2005). This may cause individuals to spend more time
scrutinizing and deliberating about the information presented to them. In other cases, warnings

presented after one initial exposure to misinformation have been shown to counteract retrievalblocking effects (Eakin et al., 2003). Retrieval blocking occurs when individuals access
misinformation at the time of testing, as opposed to original information. Early research has

demonstrated the existence of the Continued Influence Effect (CIE), a continued reliance on and
belief in misinformation after it has been discredited (Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Research
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providing individuals with specific warnings containing information about the CIE have been

shown to reduce their reliance on misinformation when recalling events from a fictitious account
(Ecker et al., 2010). General warnings (i.e., Facts reported by the media are not always checked
before being released to the public.) have been found to be less effective in reducing the impact

of misinformation than specific warnings (i.e., Even after its correction, people may rely on
inaccurate information even. For example, the belief that Iraq held weapons of mass destruction,
and the use of inadmissible evidence by a jury during court proceedings). The most effective
strategy was to combine the specific warning that provided individuals with information about
the CIE in addition to providing a correction to the misinformation through an alternative piece
of information (Ecker et al., 2010). With the spread of misinformation moving online and onto
social media platforms, researchers have also been examining how to make social media users
aware of and less likely to believe misinformation that they may encounter while on these
websites or platforms.
Misinformation warnings have recently been used on social media platforms to make the
viewer aware of misleading information (Freeze et al., 2020). Typically, valid misinformation
warnings are released from third-party institutions, such as FactCheck.org and PolitiFact, and
target misleading information (Freeze et al., 2020). Recently, the use of misinformation warnings
and fact-check alerts have been used on social media websites to reduce the circulation of

misinformation (Clayton et al., 2019). Findings from research concerning the use of online
misinformation warnings has been somewhat inconclusive: some research suggests the use of
these warnings, specifically the “Rated False” warning, lowers viewers’ perceived accuracy of a

presented headline (Clayton et al., 2019), while other research suggests that, while a warning
may increase deliberation over the veracity of a presented headline, it does not influence their
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beliefs about the information’s truthfulness (Moravec et al., 2019). Identifying a news headline

as fake news caused individuals to increase the time they spent deliberating and considering the
accuracy of the headline but did not cause participants to perceive the headline as less truthful,
nor did it reduce participants’ overall belief in the headlines. Fake news warnings were

randomized and could be applied to a true or false Facebook formatted headline, yet participants’
feelings of trust in the platform and its warnings were not assessed. Additionally, individuals
were more inclined to believe news headlines that aligned with their political beliefs-even after
the presentation of a fake news warning, which is evidence of confirmation bias. While research
has shown how misinformation and warnings may influence how individuals remember the past,
it remains unclear as to how they may shape stereotypes individuals have about particular
groups.
Stereotypes
The categorization of individuals into different groups using stereotypes helps individuals
navigate complex social environments (Brewer, 1999). Typically, in forming stereotypes,
individuals will take a trait, characteristic, or quality and form and apply a simplified
representation version of this to a social group (Bordalo et al., 2016). Individuals may also rely
on selective recall, in which stereotypes may be formed due to or reliant on both how recent and
frequent an individual is exposed to members of the stereotyped out-group (Bordalo et al., 2016).

Although this process can promote trust and cooperation among individuals with similar
characteristics in one’s ingroup, it has also been recognized to promote distrust, conflict and
potentially even a platform for hate towards members of outgroups (Brewer, 1999). One way in

which the presence of groups may incite feelings of hatred is through moral superiority, or the
feelings that “we” are more friendly and trustworthy than “them” (Brewer, 1999). Large
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ingroups may have their own rules and customs, which if seen as fixed and absolute, may not

allow for differing views and cause outgroup members to be viewed with contempt (Brewer,
1999).
The period leading up to the 2016 Presidential Election saw an increase in negative

attitudes and animosity towards partisan out-group members (Pew Research Center, 2016) The
current study will focus on majority out-group stereotypic beliefs for Republican party members
and Trump supporters to determine whether these attitudes may influence the use of conservative
language in image descriptions, and whether misinformation warnings influence these
stereotypes. Individuals draw on partisan stereotypes to make inferences about apolitical
characteristics and qualities, such as music preference (Deichert, 2019). Individuals may be
readily capable of producing stereotype-consistent characteristics as explained by the Stereotype
Content Model, which proposes that individuals belonging to different out-groups are
characterized by perceived competence and warmth (Fiske et al., 2002). These two concepts are
dimensional and result in four possible combinations from the interactions of competence and
warmth, with most groups being perceived as high in competence but low in warmth or low in
competence and high in warmth. The Stereotype Content Model also demonstrates that feelings
of high competence for a social group can be predicted by status, and that feelings of low warmth
for a social group can be predicted by competition. While alternative scales (such as the 2D ABC

Model – Agency/Socioeconomic Success, Conservative-Progressive Beliefs, and Communion)
exist to measure stereotypic beliefs and content, the present study employed the SCM scale from
Fiske et al. (2002). The communion and warmth dimension from the 2D ABC Model have a

similar correlate in the Stereotype Content Model, known as the warmth dimension, which
appears to be a confounding dimension in that groups are seen as warm or communal if they are
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rated as average on the dimensions of agency and beliefs. Due to similarities in dimensions, the

Stereotype Content Model was used and modified in the current study to elicit stereotypic beliefs
towards Trump supporters and Republicans.
Most people in the United States can spontaneously produce trait-based characteristics

that accurately align with Democrat or Republican party stereotypes (Rothschild et al., 2018).
Consistent with expectations, individuals attribute more positive characteristic stereotypes to
their own party, with Democrats more often labeling their own party members as “caring” and
“open minded” and Republicans using traits such as “honest” and “individualist”. Stereotypes
associated with partisanship may have their roots in ideological differences between parties
which in recent years have become increasingly divisive (Abramowitz & McCoy, 2018; Clifford,
2020). An ideology can be defined as an individual’s beliefs and moral values that form his or
her views (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018). Previous research has attempted to use the Cognitive
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), a three question scale used to generate intuitive answers, as a
means to identify ideological beliefs. Some findings demonstrate liberals are more reflective,
taking more time to answer the CRT questions correctly, while conservatives often answer
impulsively with the intuitive, yet incorrect, answer (Deppe et al., 2015). Other research has
demonstrated no differences between liberals and conservatives in providing correct as opposed
to intuitive answers (Kahan, 2013). Depending on an individual’s ideological beliefs, inferences

regarding their moral traits and character can be made, making stereotypical assumptions of
one’s moral priorities (Clifford, 2020). It is suggested then that partisan stereotyping of both
politicians and party members has arisen from the increasingly close relationship between

partisanship and ideology, supported by research demonstrating the existence of “psychological
differences between these groups,” (Clifford, 2020, p. 1271).
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Research has started examining the use of misinformation warnings to counteract the

effects of stereotypes on memory. Blank et al. (2019) created two online dating profiles where
the characters held two of the most stereotypically male jobs in the UK determined by a pilot
test. Profiles contained a self-description of the character and were supplemented with

characteristics and hobbies stereotypically associated with the character’s occupation.
Participants took a memory test after first viewing the profiles. After one week, participants
returned for a second memory test. With the presentation of a misinformation warning, termed
“enlightenment”, where participants were told the original occupations disclosed in the profiles
were created by the researchers, stereotype references decreased. Participants were able to recall
information from the self-descriptions as opposed to relying on the stereotypical information
associated with the character’s occupation.
Present Study

The current study will fill the gap in the literature surrounding the effects of
misinformation warnings through examining whether these social media misinformation
warnings can alter the stereotypes associated with out-group members as well as their memory of

self-generated descriptions in the form of a Tweet (to improve ecological validity by giving
participants the feeling they are contributing to social media) that are either flagged as “Rated
False”, “Disputed”, or as not being flagged at all (the control group). To examine this, we
recruited largely democratic participants, provided them with images depicting MAGA
gatherings, and had them rate stereotype items associated with Trump and Republican members.
The two misinformation warnings, “Rated false” and “Disputed” have been used on social media
websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, and previously in Clayton et al. (2019) to demonstrate a
change in the perceived accuracy of misinformation. Expanding on prior misinformation warning
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research, through the presentation of three images and warnings, we examined whether the

descriptions will be altered in the direction of the warning (i.e., if participant received the “Rated
False” warning, their subsequent descriptions will be less like their initial description).
Descriptions will be coded for conservative and liberal words, with the expectation that

participants who are presented with the “Rated False” and “Disputed” warnings will alter their
descriptions to contain fewer conservative words (H1a) given prior research has demonstrated
the “Disputed” warning can deter the sharing of misinformation (Nekmat, 2020). Furthermore, it
is hypothesized that there will be more changes to the descriptions of participants who receive
the “Rated False” warning compared to the “Disputed” warning and no warning conditions
(H1b) given prior findings that the “Rated False” warning had a larger impact than the
“Disputed” warning (Clayton et al., 2019). Additionally, because previous research has found
misinformation warnings draw individuals’ attention to accuracy (Clayton et al., 2019), it is
hypothesized that the “Rated False” misinformation warning will increase the likelihood that
participants will seek to verify and further research the scene when provided with a clickable link
(H1c). Exploratory analyses will also be conducted to determine whether the presence of a
misinformation warning can alter pre-existing stereotypes. Existing literature makes note of how
individuals are capable of spontaneously making stereotypical judgements of others based solely
on ideological or partisan identity (Rothschild et al., 2018). Given warnings have been used to

draw individuals’ attention to accuracy (Clayton et al., 2019), it is believed exploratory analyses
will reveal misinformation warnings will lessen negative stereotypic beliefs, as participants will
be prompted to think about these social groups in a more objective way (H2a). Specifically, it is

believed the changes will be more noticeable for participants who receive the “Rated False”
warning as opposed to the “Disputed” warning and no warning conditions (H2b).
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Methods
Study Design
The current study is a 3 (Warning: “Rated False,” “Disputed,” No Warning) x 2 (Time:
Pre- vs. Post-) x 2 (Descriptions: Conservative vs. Liberal) repeated measures design with
warning as a between-subjects factor, and time and descriptions as within-subjects factors. The
dependent measures are stereotype ratings, conservative and liberal language used in the
individual scenes, and the number of clicks for further information.
Participants
The sample size was determined based on a priori power analyses using the program,
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). These analyses determined that in order to run a repeated measures

and between subjects ANOVA with an experimental design examining the 3 levels of warnings
and one additional within-subjects measure, as well as three dependent measures, a sample size
of N = 216 was needed to detect a medium effect size of Cohen’s f = 0.25 with power = 0.95.
The total Qualtrics responses consisted of 279 responses. Accounting for duplicates, incomplete
surveys and excluding participants under the age of 18, the total sample used for analyses
consisted of 216 college-age students (M = 19.73, SD = 3.66). Of the 216 participants, 210
reported their gender, revealing a majority female subject pool (nfemales = 166, nmales = 43).
Participants overwhelmingly identified as Democrat (n = 139) and liberal (n = 130), followed by
neutral orientations for both partisanship (n = 41) and ideological beliefs (n = 61). Only a
marginal percentage of the sample identified as Republican (n = 11) and conservative (n = 17),
and other for partisanship (n = 25) and ideological beliefs (n = 8). This sample was chosen
knowing it would be majority Democrat/liberal leaning to keep factors within a manageable
range by examining majority out-group beliefs and whether participants’ attitudes were present
in image descriptions. Participant race was relatively diverse, the most common racial and ethnic
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identity being Hispanic (n = 67), followed by white-identifying students (n = 43), Black-

identifying (n = 33), mixed-identity (n = 29), Asian (n = 15), and other (n = 23).
Coding
The lead researcher created a coding schema for each of the two images by examining the
images and creating a list containing words regarding the contents of the image. If a word found
in the description matched a word on the list of the coding schema, it would result in one “point.”
Not all words were counted during the coding process (e.g., “the”, “a”, “is”). Words with
conservative association (e.g., “Trumpies”, “MAGA”, “All Lives Matter” or “Blue/Cop Lives
Matter”) would receive 1 point. Words with liberal association (e.g., “Biden”) or left-wing (e.g.,
“BLM” or “left leaning”) would receive 1 point. There were times in which conservative and
liberal words were written conjunctively (e.g., “fall of democracy”), in which case it was counted
as conservative associated. Each hashtag was counted and received one point for each hashtag,
creating a separate hashtag score. The two conservative and liberal scores were kept and
analyzed separately to create arbitrary scores to represent conservative and liberal terms. Hashtag
scores were kept separate from conservative and liberal scores, however due to the limited use of
hashtags in participant descriptions, could not be included in analyses.
Procedure and Materials
The current study was conducted fully online due to COVID-19 restrictions regarding in-

person research. College-age participants were recruited online through SONA, an online
recruitment portal for students to participate in research studies. Upon opening the study on
Qualtrics from the SONA link, participants were first provided with a consent form and

information about the study. In order to continue and complete the study, participants were
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required to answer whether they gave their consent, and could only continue if they responded

with “Yes.”
First Presentation of Stereotype Scales
After consenting to participate in the current study, participants were then presented with
a series of scales measuring stereotypic warmth, competency, status and competition scales to
examine participants’ stereotypic beliefs of two groups, Trump supporters and members of the
Republican parties (Fiske et al., 2002). The scales were counter-balanced so that an equal
number of participants were randomly presented with the Republican or Trump scale first. The
items measuring competency included, for example: “As viewed by society, how [competent] are
members of this group?”. The structure and wording of the question remained constant
throughout the six competence items, with “competent” being switched out with five different
words previously used to measure perceived competence of a social group (i.e., confident). The
value for Cronbach’s alpha for the 12 warmth items (6 for Republicans, 6 for Trump supporters)
was Cronbach’s  = 0.94. There were six items measuring warmth, which have the general
structure of: “As viewed by society, how [friendly] are members of this group?”. As with the

competence item, this question remained the same with the exception of the word in brackets.
The value for Cronbach’s alpha for the 12 competence items (6 for Republicans, 6 for Trump
supporters) was Cronbach’s  = 0.86. Four items were presented to participants for status (two

items) and competition (two items). Answers to all of these questions were rated on a 5-point
Likert scale, with (1) being “not at all” and (5) being “extremely” (see Appendix A for a full list
of the questions and characteristics used for this measure) 1. Scores were averaged for each

1

For the purposes of the present study, results will only focus on warmth and competence, not status and
competition.
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dimension, resulting in four average scores for competence, warmth, status and competition.

Thus the resulting dependent variable was a difference in the scores at Time 1 and Time 2, after
participants completed the scales a second time.
First Presentation of Image and Description
Directly following the stereotype pre-measure, participants were then presented with two2
randomized images of ambiguous, yet violent scenes depicting individuals in a group. The
groups in the scenes were MAGA supporters, but participants were not explicitly informed of the
nature of the individuals depicted. The scenes were depicting groups of individuals holding
weapons such as guns (Appendix B) or engaging with the police (Appendix C). Image 1 came
from a Time Magazine online article, and depicts armed Trump supporters on September 5,
2020, the day of the Kentucky Derby. Viewers can see different flags (Blue Lives Matter, Trump
2020, and the American flag), different guns and ammo, as well as military vests. Image 2 came
from an online NPR article discussing the January 6th, 2021 attack on the Capitol (this was not
overtly apparent from the image). While being presented with the image, participants were asked
to describe what they believed was happening and type their description in the form of a Tweet
(i.e., a Tweet is 270 characters long and could include the use of hashtags and more informal
language that may correlate more closely with how individuals converse online, in more nonexperimental conditions, as opposed to a “normal” description study response that may prompt

participants to use correct grammar and punctuation). After participants completed their
descriptions, they then clicked the “Next” button and, depending on the condition, participants
were given feedback immediately on whether their description of the depicted events was

2

The study was originally set up with three images, however due to an experimental design error, where one of the
images did not match from the original (pre) to second (post) viewing in the Disputed condition, analyses were
conducted using only two images.
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“accurate or not.” As such, their tweet was either flagged as “Rated false,” “Disputed” or were

given feedback highlighting no issues found in their Tweet. If participants were in either of the
warning conditions, they received a warning, regardless of whether the content of their Tweet
was subjective or objective. Alongside the feedback, all participants were provided with a link

that offered participants with the option to conduct further research as to the contents and context
of the image. If participants wished to view the article, they chose “Yes” to the question: “Would
you like to view the original article where this image originated from?”, and were taken to
another page within the Qualtrics survey containing the source of the image: a news article
describing the context surrounding the image.
Cognitive Response Test
After participants submitted their descriptions and/or finished reading the articles from
the link, they clicked “Next” and were asked to answer three items from a Cognitive Response
Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005): “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents,” “If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5
widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? _____ minutes,” and “In a
lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the
patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
_____ days”. The correct answers to these questions are: 5 cents; 5 minutes; and 47 days. These

questions were designed to generate intuitive answers, the intuitive answers being: 10 cents; 100
minutes; and 24 days. The CRT has been used to determine differences between individuals who
are impulsive and offer the intuitive answer more quickly, compared to those who take their time

and are more reflective in forming their responses. Results from the CRT have been used
previously to examine differences in response times between conservatives and liberals. Previous
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research has demonstrated liberals take more time to figure out the correct answer as opposed to

conservatives who are faster to respond and, in doing so, typically offer the intuitive answer
(Deppe et al., 2015). Determining if there are differences in reflection between conservatives and
liberals may aid in understanding the change, if any, in stereotypic beliefs and memory of the

image descriptions as a result of the warnings.
Seven Point Michigan Scale
Following the CRT, participants were then asked to provide answers to two items from
the Seven Point Michigan Scale (Green, 1993) to determine party and ideological identification.
The first is “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat,
Independent, or what?”. Responses to this question are listed on an 8-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (Strong Democrat) to 7 (Strong Republican) and 8 as the “other party” option. The
second item is related to ideology which was adapted to read: “On a scale from extremely liberal
to extremely conservative, what are the typical political views you might hold?”. Responses to
this question were, again, on an 8-point Likert scale from 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 7 (Extremely
Conservative) and (8) is “other.”
Second Presentation of Stereotype Scales
After participants responded to both the CRT and Seven Point Michigan Scale items,
participants again answered items from Fiske et al. (2002) approximately 15 minutes after first

presentation at Time 1 to get measures of warmth at competence, status, and competition to
determine underlying stereotypic beliefs. These items were the same as the items presented at
Time 1. The values for the Cronbach alphas for the 12 competence and 12 warmth items were

Cronbach’s  = 0.91, and Cronbach’s  = 0.96, respectively.
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Second Presentation of Image and Description

Following the completion of the scales, participants were then again provided with the
original images and asked to recall what they originally described in their Tweet about the
images. Images were again presented in a randomized order, such that the first picture they were

presented with at Time 1 would be different than the first picture presented at Time 2. Depending
on how long it took participants to answer the scales, this post-measure occurred approximately
10 to 15 minutes after originally viewing the images. Answers to these questions were open
ended, allowing participants to use their own words to describe each scene and to avoid leading
questions or suggested answers. The exact wording of the question was as follows: “To the best
of your ability and as accurately as you can, please recall how you initially described the events
from the first scene.”
Demographics and Study Conclusion
Demographic information was collected at the end of the study. Participants were asked
questions regarding gender and racial identity, age, education level, full or part-time
employment, and whether they were in a relationship. See Appendix D for a complete list of
questions and possible responses. The answers to these seven questions were in an open-response
format. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time. Participants completed the
study, on average, in 37 minutes.
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Results

In describing the results of the study, general observations and preliminary results are
discussed first, which includes image and demographic variable differences. Following
preliminary results is the primary analyses, focusing on the impact of warnings in influencing

memory for the picture descriptions and perceived stereotypes.
General Observations and Preliminary Results
Party Identification
Party identification was identified using the Green Seven Point Michigan Scale ranging
from “Strong Democrat” (1) to “Strong Republican” (7) with the inclusion of an “Other” option
(8). Scores were consolidated to create four scores: “Democrat” (1), “Neutral” (2), “Republican”
(3) and “Other” (4). A score of Democrat was given to participants who answered 1-3 on the
Seven Point Michigan Scale, Neutral was a 4 on the original scale, Republican was 5-7 on the
original scale, and Other was 8 on the original scale. Of the sample, 139 participants identified as
Democrat, 41 were Neutral, 11 identified as Republican, and 25 were Other.
Description Analyses – Image and Demographics

To determine whether there was an effect of image on analyses for descriptions, a 2 x 2 x
2 x 3 mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted, where time, image, and
description content (conservative vs liberal) were within-subjects factors, and warning type was

a between-subjects factor. The dependent variable in these analyses was the use and amount of
conservative and liberal language use changed, to determine whether one image elicited longer
responses than the other. Analyses demonstrated a main effect of time, image, content, as well as

interaction effects between time and content, as well as image and content, F(1, 213) = 69.10, p
< 0.001, 2 = 0.25, F(1, 213) = 13.13, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.06, F(1, 213) = 803.45, p < 0.001, 2 =
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0.79, F(1, 213) = 67.00, p < 0.001. 2 = 0.24, F(1, 213) = 14.77, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.07. There

were no other main or interaction effects. The main effect of time demonstrates a decrease in the
lengths of descriptions from Time 1 to Time 2, suggesting shorter descriptions at Time 2. The
main effect of image reflected the fact that participants provided more words when presented
with Image 2 (M = 5.87, SD = 3.61; M = 5.25, SD = 3.13). Viewers can see a man in a gas mask
spraying bear spray, and different flags (Trump 2020, American flag, and Gadsden flag). Given
these differences, further analyses will examine descriptions taking Image into account. The
main effect of description content reflects a higher use of conservative language over liberal
language. The interaction effect between time and description content reflects a decrease in
conservative language from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas there was no significant difference
between the use of liberal language from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 1). The interaction
between image and content suggests a higher use of conservative language in Image 2, and
higher use of liberal language in Image 1 (see Table 1).
Table 1
Average Description Lengths by Time, Image, Content, and Warning
Image/Warning
Image 1
No Warning
Disputed
Rated False
Image 2
No Warning
Disputed
Rated False

Conservative
Time 1

Conservative
Time 2

Liberal Time 1

Liberal Time 2

5.80 (3.25)
5.07 (3.30)
4.83 (2.76)

3.85 (2.29)
3.93 (3.08)
3.97 (2.62)

0.05 (0.23)
0.07 (0.26)
0.09 (0.37)

0.07 (0.25)
0.08 (0.33)
0.06 (0.29)

6.51 (3.74)
5.96 (3.94)
5.09 (2.99)

4.55 (2.99)
4.58 (3.07)
3.83 (2.52)

0.05 (0.23)
0.10 (0.38)
0.01 (0.12)

0.04 (0.20)
0.01 (0.12)
0.03 (0.17)

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
To examine whether the results of the present study were influenced by our demographic
variables a series of 2 x 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA with time and description content
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(liberal or conservative content) as within-subjects factors, and warning as a between-subjects

factor. In these analyses, changes in description content (conservative and liberal language use)
from Time 1 to Time 2 was the dependent variable of interest. The analyses below will take into
account the effect, if there is one, of demographic variables including: race, age, and gender

through including them as covariates. For Image 1, depicting armed Trump supporters, analyses
revealed a main effect of description content, time, as well as interaction effects between time
and warning type (“Rated False”, “Disputed”, or no warning), and description content and time,
F(1, 192) = 95.37, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.33, F(1, 192) = 5.50, p = 0.02, 2 = 0.03, F(2, 192) = 3.12, p
< 0.05, 2 = 0.03, F(1, 192) = 5.68, p = 0.02, 2 = 0.03, respectively. Analyses revealed there
were no interaction effects between the demographic variables and time, description content, or
warning type. For Image 2, depicting a man using bear spray at the January 6th Capitol riots,
analyses revealed a main effect of description content, and an interaction effect of time and age,
as well as an interaction between description content, time and gender, F(1, 192) = 82.89, p <
0.001, 2 = 0.30, F(1, 192) = 4.55, p = 0.03, 2 = 0.02, F(1, 192) = 4.27, p = 0.04, 2 = 0.02,
respectively. The main effect of description content demonstrates conservative oriented language

was used more than liberal oriented language. The interaction effect between time and age
suggests with age, the description content from Time 1 to Time 2 becomes increasingly less
conservative oriented. Finally, the interaction effect between description content, time and

gender suggests female participants used more conservative language than males at both Time 1
and Time 2, but also showed a larger decrease in the use of conservative language from Time 1
to Time 2 than males. These differences were not examined further given the limited variability

in the sample in terms of both gender and age (the majority of the sample is female and around
20 years of age).
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Memory Recall
Description Content
Based on the coding schema, specific conservative words received 1 point each, liberal
words received 1 point each, average word counts were found for both groups for both images at
Time 1 and Time 2. To examine differences in liberal versus conservative words in descriptions,
a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA was run, with description content and time as withinsubjects factors, and warning type a between-subjects factor. These were done separately for
Image 1 and Image 2, as preliminary analyses showed differences between the images.
For Image 1, portraying an armed group of Trump supporters, analyses revealed a main
effect of time, description content, and an interaction between time and description content, F(1,
213) = 42.47, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.17; F(1, 213) = 734.15, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.78; F(1, 213) = 41.43,
p < 0.001, 2 = 0.16, respectively. There were no main or interaction effects for misinformation
warnings. The main effect for time reflects the fact that fewer words were used from Time 1 to
Time 2 (M = 5.31, SD = 3.13; M = 3.99, SD = 2.72). The main effect for description content
demonstrated a higher usage of conservative than liberal words within descriptions (M = 4.58,

SD = 2.49; M = 0.07, SD = 0.25). To examine the interaction between time and description,
planned t-tests were conducted and found that the interaction was driven by description content,
such that conservative words were used less frequently from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas there is

no significant difference between the number of liberal words from Time 1 to Time 2 given the
scarce use of liberal language, t(215) = 6.53, p < 0.001, d = 0.44, t(215) = 0.00, p = 0.50, d =
0.00, respectively (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1
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For Image 2, portraying a scene from the Capitol riot, again, analyses revealed main

effects of time, and description content, and an interaction effect between time and description
content, F(1, 213) = 49.03, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.19, F(1, 213) = 706.71, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.77, F(1,
213) = 54.05, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.20, respectively. The main effect of time demonstrates an overall
decrease in words across time (M = 5.92, SD = 3.60; M = 4.37, SD = 2.85). The main effect of
description content demonstrates a higher use of conservative words in descriptions as opposed
to liberal words (M = 5.10, SD = 2.86; M = 0.04, SD = 0.16). Again, planned t-tests were
conducted to examine the interaction between time and description content, demonstrating the
interaction was driven by decreases in conservative language across time, while there were no
significant changes in the use of liberal language from Time 1 to Time 2, t(215) = 7.20, p <
0.001, d = 0.49, t(215) = 1.34, p = 0.09, d = 0.09, respectively (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2
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Results for both images do not support hypothesis H1a, which posits participants who

receive the “Rated False” and “Disputed” warnings will alter their descriptions, as all
participants altered descriptions across time. Nor do analyses support hypothesis H1b, which
posits the “Rated False” warning will elicit more changes to descriptions than the “Disputed”

warning or no warning, as analyses revealed no effect of warning on description content.
Description Content and Party Identification
Additional analyses were run with adequate power including party ideology as a
between-subjects measure, resulting in a 2 x 2 x 3 x 4 mixed measures ANOVA, with time and
description content (conservative vs liberal) as within-subjects measures, and warning as
between-subjects. Party ideology consisted of: Democrat, Neutral, Republican, or Other. The
dependent measure is the difference in the number of coded words (conservative vs liberal) used
from Time 1 to Time 2. Conservative and liberal words were kept and analyzed separately,
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creating two sets of numbers for analysis. For the image of armed Trump supporters (Image 1),

analyses revealed a main effect of time and description content, as well as an interaction effect
between time and description content, F(1, 204) = 20.76, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.09, F(1, 204) =
342.20, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.63, F(1, 204) = 21.29, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.09, respectively. The main
effect of time demonstrates a decrease in both conservative and liberal words from Time 1 to
Time 2 (M = 5.31, SD = 3.13; M = 3.99, SD = 2.72). A main effect of description content
demonstrates a higher use of conservative words in descriptions as opposed to liberal words (M =
4.58, SD = 2.49; M = 0.07, SD = 0.25). The interaction effect between time and description
content demonstrates even though it decreased from Time 1 to Time 2, there was a higher use of
conservative oriented language over liberal oriented language at Time 1 and Time 2 (see Table
2). While conservative word usage decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 across all identified parties,
Republicans had the highest average of conservative words in descriptions than others in the
“Disputed” warning condition (see Table 2).
Table 2
Image 1 - Average Conservative and Liberal Words Used in Descriptions at Time 1 and Time 2

Warning
Type/Partisan
Identity
No Warning
Democrat
Neutral
Republican
Other
Disputed
Democrat
Neutral
Republican
Other
Rated False
Democrat
Neutral

Conservative
Time 1

Conservative
Time 2

Liberal Time 1

Liberal Time 2

5.77 (3.26)
5.17 (2.13)
4.80 (2.68)
8.17 (4.83)

4.04 (2.27)
3.33 (2.06)
2.80 (2.28)
4.17 (3.13)

0.06 (0.24)
0.00 (0.00)
0.20 (0.45)
0.00 (0.00)

0.08 (0.27)
0.00 (0.00)
0.20 (0.45)
0.00 (0.00)

5.24 (3.41)
4.50 (3.15)
7.00 (3.00)
4.75 (3.33)

4.10 (3.19)
3.44 (2.73)
5.67 (3.06)
3.50 (3.51)

0.02 (0.15)
0.06 (0.24)
0.33 (0.58)
0.25 (0.46)

0.05 (0.22)
0.11 (0.47)
0.33 (0.58)
0.13 (0.35)

4.56 (2.40)
6.18 (3.76)

3.84 (2.32)
5.55 (3.73)

0.04 (0.30)
0.18 (0.60)

0.04 (0.30)
0.09 (0.30)
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Republican
Other

3.67 (1.53)
4.91 (3.11)

4.33 (1.16)
2.82 (2.32)

0.33 (0.58)
0.09 (0.30)

0.33 (0.58)
0.00 (0.00)

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
For the image portraying a scene from the January 6th Capitol riots (Image 2), analyses
revealed a main effect of time and description content, as well as an interaction effect between
time and description content, F(1, 204) = 27.24, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.12, F(1, 204) = 320.01, p <
0.001, 2 = 0.61, F(1, 204) = 30.71, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.13, respectively. The main effect of time

suggests descriptions decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 (M = 5.92, SD = 3.60; M = 4.37, SD =
2.85). The main effect of description content demonstrates conservative language was used more
than liberal language regardless of partisan identity, warning type or time (M = 5.10, SD = 2.86;

M = 0.04, SD = 0.16). Finally, the interaction between time and description content demonstrates
a higher use of conservative oriented language, even though both conservative and liberal
oriented language decreased from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 3). Again, Republican identifying
participants’ descriptions had the highest number of conservative words compared to any other
identification at Time 1 for Image 2 (see Table 3). Use of conservative words by Republican
participants was not statistically different than other parties at Time 1.
Table 3
Image 2 - Average Conservative and Liberal Words Used in Descriptions at Time 1 and Time 2
Warning
Type/Partisan
Identity
No Warning
Democrat
Neutral
Republican
Other
Disputed
Democrat
Neutral

Conservative
Time 1

Conservative
Time 2

Liberal Time 1

Liberal Time 2

6.79 (4.03)
5.42 (2.31)
6.20 (4.32)
6.50 (3.27)

4.81 (2.92)
4.17 (3.10)
2.60 (1.95)
4.67 (3.98)

0.06 (0.24)
0.08 (0.29)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)

0.04 (0.19)
0.00 (0.00)
0.20 (0.45)
0.00 (0.00)

6.36 (4.39)
5.06 (2.44)

4.76 (2.82)
4.11 (3.23)

0.05 (0.31)
0.00 (0.00)

0.00 (0.00)
0.06 (0.24)
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Republican
Other
Rated False
Democrat
Neutral
Republican
Other

8.33 (3.79)
5.00 (4.11)

8.00 (3.61)
3.37 (3.34)

0.00 (0.00)
0.63 (0.74)

0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)

4.78 (2.53)
6.36 (4.27)
7.67 (3.51)
4.36 (2.84)

3.73 (2.18)
4.64 (2.94)
3.33 (5.03)
3.55 (2.88)

0.02 (0.15)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)

0.03 (0.17)
0.02 (0.16)
0.09 (0.30)
0.00 (0.00)

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Link Click
To determine whether misinformation warnings influenced the likelihood participants
clicked on the link, a one-way ANOVA was conducted with warning type as the independent
variable, and link clicking as the dependent variable. Analyses were conducted for Image 1 and
Image 2 separately. For both the armed Trump supporters image (Image 1) and January 6th
Capitol riots scene (Image 2), analyses revealed no effect of misinformation warning on
likelihood of clicking on the link, F(2, 213) = 0.12, p = 0.89, 2 = 0.00, F(2, 213) = 0.10, p =
0.91, 2 = 0.00, respectively. These analyses demonstrate for both images, the misinformation
warnings did not influence the likelihood for participants to click and follow the link to view
further information, which does not support H1c, which states misinformation warnings will

increase the likelihood of clicking on the link.
To determine whether a change in descriptions was due to clicking the link to read the
article provided, link click was added as a between-subjects measure. The resulting analyses

were a 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA with time (descriptions at Time 1 vs Time 2) as a
within-subjects measure, and link click and warning as the between-subjects measures. The
dependent variable was changes in description content. These analyses were done separately for
Image 1 and Image 2. For Image 1, 137 participants followed the link to the article. Analyses
revealed no main effect of link clicking on results for time, nor any interaction effects between
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time and condition F(1, 210) = 0.85, p = 0.36, 2 = 0.00, F(2, 210) = 0.56, p = 0.58, 2 = 0.01,

respectively. For Image 2, 139 participants followed the link to the article. Analyses revealed the
same results for Image 2, with no main effect of link clicking on time, nor any interaction effects
between link click and time, or time, condition and link click F(1, 210) = 0.09, p = 0.77, 2 =
0.00, F(2, 210) = 1.05, p = 0.35, 2 = 0.01. Results for both images suggest clicking the link did
not influence the changes in descriptions.
Stereotypes
Warmth
Analyses were conducted for the Warmth and Competence levels of the Fiske et al.
(2002) stereotype scale to see whether warnings influenced stereotypes, as these scales have been
used previously to determine the existence of stereotypic beliefs. Warmth scores were the
dependent variable. A mixed measures 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA with time and social group

(Republican or Trump supporter) as within-subjects factors, and warning received (“Rated
False”, “Disputed”, or no warning) as the between-subject factor found a main effect for time
and social group, as well as a 3-way interaction effect between social group, time, and warning

type, F(1, 215) = 18.75, p < 0.0001, 2 = 0.08, F(1, 213) = 103.76, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.33, F(2,
213) = 3.05, p < 0.05, 2 = 0.03, respectively. Analyses revealed no other main or interaction
effects. The main effect for time demonstrates that participants rated both social groups lower on
perceived warmth at Time 2 than Time 1 (see Table 4). The main effect of social group
demonstrates participants rated Republicans higher in warmth than Trump supporters (M = 2.15,
SD = 0.79; M = 1.76, SD = 0.75). To examine the 3-way interaction, planned post-hoc tests
revealed warning type, specifically the “Rated False” warning, caused a decrease in warmth
stereotype scores for Republicans only (see Table 5).
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Table 4

Average Stereotype Scores for Republicans and Trump Supporters
Scale/Group
Warmth
Republican
Trump
Total
Competence
Republican
Trump
Total

Time 1

Time 2

p

2.23 (0.80)
1.80 (0.80)
2.01 (0.72)

2.07 (0.89)
1.72 (0.89)
1.90 (0.76)

< 0.001
0.01
< 0.001

2.91 (0.69)
2.62 (0.73)
2.76 (0.63)

2.73 (0.83)
2.50 (0.87)
2.61 (0.79)

< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Table 5
Average Warmth Scores for Republicans and Trump Supporters by Warning Type
Warning
Type
No Warning

Social Group

Time 1

Time 2

S.E.

p

95% C.I.

Republican
Trump

2.27 (0.77)
1.82 (0.74)

2.19 (0.87)
1.64 (0.69)

0.07
0.05

0.26
0.001*

-0.06, 0.22
0.07, 0.28

Republican
Trump

2.29 (0.88)
1.85 (0.90)

2.13 (0.96)
1.85 (0.85)

0.07
0.06

0.03*
0.97

0.01, 0.30
-0.11, 0.11

Republican
Trump

2.11 (0.75)
1.72 (0.76)

1.88 (0.80)
1.68 (0.74)

0.07
0.06

0.002*
0.52

0.09, 0.38
-0.07, 0.14

Disputed

Rated False

Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Table demonstrates 3-way interaction
between time, social group, and warning type.
Competence
To examine scores of perceived competence, a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA was
conducted with time and social group as within-subject factors and warning type as a betweensubject factor. Time acted as the independent variable and scores for the perceived competence
of Republican party members and Trump supporters as the dependent variable. Analyses
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demonstrated a main effect of social group and time in examining competence scores for both

Republican and Trump supporters, F(1, 213) = 48.83, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.19, F(1, 213) = 25.83, p
< 0.001, 2 = 0.11, respectively. Analyses did not demonstrate an effect of warning type, F(2,
213) = 0.63, p = 0.54, 2 = 0.01. No additional main or interaction effects were found. The main
effect of time demonstrates that participants rated Republicans and Trump supporters lower in
competence at Time 2 than Time 1 (see Table 4). The main effect for social group demonstrates
participants had higher competence ratings for Republicans than Trump supporters (M = 2.82,
SD = 0.70; M = 2.56, SD = 0.76). Given analyses showed no main effect of warning suggests that
participants’ perceptions of Republican party members and Trump supporters’ competence were
similar across warning type (“Rated False”, “Disputed”, or no warning).
Discussion
The aims of the current study were threefold: (1) to examine whether the two
misinformation warnings, “Rated False” and “Disputed”, can act as a warning and cause
participants to alter their original, self-generated descriptions of an inherently violent and
politically charged scene; (2) to examine whether warnings increase the likelihood for
participants to click on a link to review further information surrounding the image; and as an
exploratory analysis (3) to examine whether these warnings could alter participants’ stereotypic
attitudes and beliefs towards Republican party members and Trump supporters. In line with some
of the prior research from Moravec et al. (2019), results demonstrate no effect of misinformation
warnings on memory recall. This may be because participants were asked to provide selfgenerated descriptions of violent scenes, whereas prior research has examined the influence of
misinformation warnings on headlines and articles participants read. Participants’ Tweets could
be either accurate or not and they would still receive a warning. Results also demonstrated no
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effect of misinformation warnings on link clicking. Finally, exploratory analyses demonstrated
an effect of the “Rated False” warning on stereotypic beliefs towards Republicans, but not
Trump supporters. The discussion will first address the results and analyses regarding the impact
of misinformation warnings on self-generated descriptions, followed by the exploratory analyses
of misinformation warnings and stereotype scales. Finally, limitations and future directions will
be discussed.
Misinformation Warnings
Prior research has found mixed results when it comes to misinformation warnings. While
some studies have found they work, others have found they do not. For example, Clayton et al.
(2019) demonstrated a “Rated False” warning lowered participants’ perceived accuracy of a
headline. Alternatively, results from Moravec et al. (2019) found misinformation warnings did
not alter participants’ judgements of the truth of a headline. The present results support research
finding no effect of misinformation warnings on self-generated descriptions and memory recall.
This could be due to the fact that participants were asked to write their own descriptions and then
were provided with feedback and a warning that suggested what they had written was “Rated
False” or “Disputed”. While both warnings have been found to be effective, the “Disputed”
warning has drawn some speculation that it may be inconclusive and not as direct as the “Rated
False” warning (Clayton et al., 2019; Pennycook et al., 2017). These findings do not support our
original hypothesis, formed from previous literature that has demonstrated individuals perceive
false headlines as less accurate when they are accompanied by these warnings, with the “Rated
False” tag demonstrating a larger effect than the “Disputed” warning (Clayton et al., 2019).
However, participants in the current study were presented with the “Rated False” and “Disputed”
warnings after providing their own original descriptions to the images they were presented, as

37
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA WARNINGS
opposed to being shown a headline or news blurb with factual or false information. Although
having participants create their own Tweet may increase ecological validity, the misinformation
warnings used in the current study and in previous research may not be the most effective in
prompting individuals to think about and change what they had originally written. Future studies
can further increase ecological validity if, at second exposure to the images, instead of asking
participants to remember and restate what they had originally written at Time 1, participants are
asked to describe the image presented at Time 2.
Previous research examining misinformation warnings has demonstrated the presentation
of a warning draws attention to accuracy (Clayton et al., 2019). This research informed a third
hypothesis (H1c), which posited the presentation of the “Rated False” and “Disputed” warnings
would increase the likelihood for participants to click on a link that would take them to the
source of the image. Results do not support this hypothesis, as neither of the warnings influenced
whether participants clicked on the link. A possible explanation for this may be that participants
provided their own self-generated descriptions for the images. Even with the presentation of
misinformation warnings, participants may have been more inclined to further research an image
knowing the information they originally provided in their descriptions may not have been fully
accurate when they wrote them and not see a reason to correct them. A further explanation may
be the platform itself. Although the warnings were presented as having been from a third-party
source, participants may have had preconceived notions about Twitter and therefore, been less
likely to alter their descriptions. Further research should examine the neutrality, or
conservative/liberal leaning, of social media platforms and how this may influence the impact of
a misinformation warning.
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Stereotypes
While more work is needed, there has been some research examining the impacts of
warnings on stereotypes, which has suggested the presentation of warnings causes individuals to
recall autobiographical information about a character as opposed to stereotypical information
(Blank et al., 2019). For the present study, contrary to the original hypothesis which predicted
stereotypes would become higher for warmth and competence after the presentation of the
“Rated False” and “Disputed” warnings, results demonstrate the misinformation warnings used
in the current study had no effect on participants’ stereotypic beliefs towards Republicans and
Trump supporters with the exception of a decrease in warmth ratings for Republicans for
participants who received the “Rated False” warning. Results of the current study did
demonstrate however that across time, participants’ stereotype scores decreased for warmth and
competence from Time 1 to Time 2, regardless of the presence of a warning or not.
The political climate has become increasingly divisive between Democratic and
Republican parties, with researchers examining partisan stereotypes as a means to inform
partisanship instability (Josefson, 2000). The stereotype scale used in the current study was
tested previously by Fiske et al. (2002), where different social groups were rated along two trait
continuums, warmth and competence. Results from the current study indicate college-aged
participants rated Republicans as higher in both trait variables, with Republicans viewed as
slightly more competent than Trump Supporters, and Republicans as warmer than Trump
Supporters. However, both trait and total ratings were below a 3.0, suggesting negative attitudes
and stereotypic beliefs towards both groups. At all levels, Trump supporters elicited greater
negative stereotypic attitudes than did Republican party members. In all cases, stereotype scores
decreased from pre- to post-test, meaning that over the course of completing the study,
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participants’ responses for stereotype items became more negative towards both Republican
party members and Trump supporters.
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals who hold negative stereotypes or
prejudices for other groups may encode and judge members of those groups differently, being
more thoughtful and paying greater attention to instances of stereotype-inconsistent behaviors as
opposed to stereotype-consistent behaviors (Sherman et al., 2005). Individuals who are high in
stereotypical beliefs are more likely to make stereotypical judgements of others belonging to
stereotype-prone groups. In the present study, participants who were largely Democratic, were
asked to describe the events taking place in a violent scene of MAGA supporters. Results
demonstrate warmth and competence stereotype scores for Trump supporters and Republicans
decreased over time. Participants’ stereotypic beliefs may have impacted the language used in
descriptions, as the use of conservative language was higher than use of liberal language from
Time 1 to Time 2.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study, however, was not without its limitations. First, due to experimenter
error during study design, one of the pre-test images for the Disputed condition was incorrect and
did not match the third post-test image, so analyses could not be conducted on one of the images.
However, as mentioned in the results, given the number of participants in the sample and the
observed power, this did not seem to impact the findings, though it is impossible to say what the
true impacts of this error were.
Second, participants first completed the two stereotype scales for Republican party
members and Trump supporters, which could have primed participants to more readily call on
conservative oriented terms and stereotypes when presented with the violent images of MAGA
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supporters. This in turn may have increased the use of conservative associated words and
language in their written descriptions than may have been the case had they not answered the
stereotype scales first. One explanation for this may be confirmation bias, where participants
demonstrate an intent to accept information that aligns with pre-existing beliefs that can be used
to support their arguments (Edgerly et al., 2020). Future studies may examine whether presenting
the images or scales first impacts the prevalence of negative language in descriptions.
Third, the length of descriptions, specifically conservative language, decreased from
Time 1 to Time 2 across all conditions, which may have to do with unintended effects from the
repeated measures design. One possible explanation for this is a decreased interest in the study as
participants worked to complete it. Previous research has suggested boredom may impact
performance on repeated measures studies (Milyavskaya et al., 2021). As participants lost
interest in a study, they exhibited a decreased willingness to exert effort on the tasks provided to
them and reported higher levels of fatigue. While the average time to complete the study was 37
minutes, participants may have lost interest in having to rewrite their original descriptions.
Future studies may include measures to examine levels of fatigue or interest to determine
whether there were any unintended causes for the decrease in description length. A second
possible explanation for the decrease in description length could be due to the way participants
were asked to provide their description at Time 2. At Time 2 participants were asked to do their
best to remember and provide what they stated at Time 1. This may have caused participants to
have actively overcome any changes they may have made as a result of the warning they
received. Although this would slightly alter the research question, follow up studies should ask
participants to describe the picture again at Time 2.
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Fourth, given that this was a convenience sample of urban college-age students with
largely liberal, democratic views, it may be helpful to expand the participant pool in the future as
this may have impacted the generalizability of our findings. With a largely Democratic sample,
both the stereotype scales and images were examining participants’ views and calling on
participants’ biases of out-group members for a majority of participants. Participants’
descriptions of the images were largely conservative oriented. Future studies may seek to include
a more diverse sample to determine whether these findings can be replicated, or result in
observable differences, such as liberal oriented descriptions or less conservative oriented
language. Having a larger sample including Republican and conservative participants will allow
researchers to expand on the valences and contents of these descriptions through examining
beliefs and attitudes towards in-group members. A larger and more diverse sample, may also
make it possible to include more social groups, such as Black Lives Matter (BLM) or Democrats,
for the stereotype scales that would allow for the broader analyses of in-group versus out-group
beliefs and attitudes. Additionally, including scales and images of different social groups may
allow for comparison of how Republicans/conservatives view in-group/out-group members
differently than Democrats/liberals.
Last, while the current study aims to expand on the existing research surrounding the use
of misinformation warnings through examining their impact on memory recall for self-generated
descriptions and stereotypic beliefs, as previous research has not examined their effects on selfgenerated descriptions. Results from the current study suggest misinformation warnings have no
effect on memory recall for self-generated descriptions. Previous research has demonstrated
mixed effects of misinformation warnings (Clayton et al., 2019; Moravec et al., 2019), and
expanding on the methodology used in the present study for the images (presenting an image and
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asking the participant to write their own Tweet) may help in understanding under what
conditions misinformation warnings affect memory recall. The methodology should be expanded
to create two conditions to determine whether misinformation warnings continue to demonstrate
no influence on memories for self-generated descriptions of events, while also examining
whether they influence memories for presented misinformation. One of these conditions would
use the current methodology, while a second would present participants with an image and
vignette to read, along with the presentation of a warning. The warning can be placed before or
after, with preexposure warnings being found to reduce the effects of misinformation in previous
research (Ecker et al., 2010). The post-test prompt would present participants with the original
image and ask them to provide as many details as they can remember from the original
description. This condition would act as a counterbalancing measure to examine whether these
warnings (“Rated False” and “Disputed”) can go beyond lowering participants’ perceived
accuracy of a headline (Clayton et al., 2019) and impact participants’ ability to recall certain
elements of the original descriptions.
Conclusion
This was a novel study examining the impact of misinformation warnings on memory
recall for one’s own self-generated descriptions of events in an image. Participants were
provided with violent scenes focused on MAGA protestors, though none of this information was
explicitly told to participants. Image 1 depicted armed Trump supporters gathering on the day of
the Kentucky Derby in 2020, while Image 2 focused on an individual in a gas mask spraying
bear spray on the January 6th attack on the Capitol. While misinformation warnings did not have
the hypothesized effect on memory recall for self-generated descriptions or on the likelihood of
clicking on a link to read the source article for the image, the “Rated False” warning actually
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decreased participants’ warmth stereotypes for Republicans. While there are limitations and
further research is needed, the present study adds to the growing line of research examining the
importance of social media warnings and their ability (or lack thereof) to mitigate the mnemonic
and stereotypic consequence associated with disseminating misinformation via social media.
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Appendix A

Fiske et al., 2002 Perceived Competence and Warmth Questionnaire
Competence Items
-

As viewed by society, how… are members of this group?

-

Competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent, skillful

Warmth Items
-

As viewed by society, how… are members of this group?

-

Friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, sincere

Status Items
-

How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by members of this group?

-

How economically successful have members of this group been?

Competition Items
-

If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), this
is likely to make things more difficult for people like me.

-

Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the resources of
people like me.
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Appendix B

Armed pro-Trump militia members during a demonstration on the day of the Kentucky Derby.

53
EFFECTIVENESS OF SOCIAL MEDIA WARNINGS
Appendix C

One image demonstrating a scene from the January 6th Capitol riots.
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Appendix D
Demographics
-

What is your gender?
o

-

What is your age?
o

-

Possible answers: Yes, No, Part-time, Full-time

What is your relationship status?
o

3

Possible answers: Associates degree, High school, Some college

Are you employed? Full-time or part-time?
o

-

Possible answers: Black, White, Latinx, Asian, West Indian, mixed

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
o

-

Possible answers: Yes, No, Hispanic

How would you identify yourself as it pertains to race/ethnicity? Please list all that apply.
o

-

Possible answers: 18 - 423

Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?
o

-

Possible answers: Male, Female, Other, Prefer not to say

Possible answers: Single, In a relationship, N/A, Taken

Twelve participants under the age of 18 were excluded from analyses
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Supplemental Materials
Stereotype Correlation Analyses – Manipulation Check
Correlation analyses were conducted as a manipulation check to determine whether
relationships exist between status and competence items and competition and warmth items as
has been found previously by Fiske et al. (2002). Analyses demonstrated a positive correlation
between pre-test status and competence, r(216) = 0.50, p < 0.001, as well as a negative
correlation between pre-test competition and warmth, r(216) = -0.29, p < 0.001. There were also
positive correlations between pre-test competence and warmth, r(216) = 0.63, p < 0.001, and a
positive correlation between pre-test status and competition, r(216) = 0.30, p < 0.001. These
patterns held for correlation analyses for post-test items as well, with a positive correlation
between status and competence, r(216) = 0.50, p < 0.001, a negative correlation between
competition and warmth, r(216) = -0.19, p < 0.01. Correlation analyses for post-test items also
revealed a positive correlation between competence and warmth, r(216) = 0.63, p < 0.001, and a
positive correlation between status and competition, r(216) = 0.25, p < 0.001. These results
support the original findings from Fiske et al. (2002).
Fiske et al. (2002) Stereotype Predictor Scales
Status
To examine how warnings influence perceived status of Republican party members and

Trump supporters, I ran a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed measures ANOVA with time and social group
(Republican and Trump supporters) as within-subjects measures, and warning type as the
between-subjects measure. Analyses revealed a main effect of time and group, as well as an
interaction effect between time and group, F(1, 213) = 10.11, p < 0.01, 2 = 0.05, F(1, 213) =
81.98, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.28, F(1, 213) = 11.16, p < 0.001, 2 = 0.01 respectively, on participants’
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ratings of perceived status of Republicans and Trump supporters. No other main or interaction

effects were found. A main effect of time suggests that participants perceptions of status changed
from Time 1 to Time 2, while the main effect of group suggests ratings were different between
the two groups. The presence of this interaction effect accounts for the differences observed

between groups and over time, as scores increased slightly from Time 1 (M = 2.85, SD = 0.94) to
Time 2 (M = 2.86, SD = 1.04) for Trump supporters, yet decreased from Republicans from Time
1 (M = 3.40, SD = 0.88) to Time 2 (M = 3.17, SD = 0.98).
Competition
To examine how warnings influenced participants’ perceptions of competition between
themselves and Republican party members, as well as Trump supporters, I ran a 2 x 2 x 3 mixed
measures ANOVA with time and social group (Republican and Trump supporters) as withinsubjects measures, and warning type as the between-subjects measure. Analyses revealed only a
main effect of group, F(1, 213) = 5.28, p < 0.05, 2 = 0.02. Analyses did not reveal any other
main or interaction effects for perceived status. This main effect of group demonstrates
participants reported higher levels of competition for Trump supporters (M = 3.52, SD = 1.20)

than Republicans (M = 3.43, SD = 1.13).
Cognitive Reflection Test
A one-way ANOVA with partisan identity as the between-subjects factor and CRT score

as the dependent variable demonstrates no main effect of partisan identity on CRT results, F(3,
205) = 0.05, p = 0.98, 2 = 0.00. A one-way ANOVA with political ideology as the betweensubjects factor and CRT as the dependent variable demonstrates no main effect of political
ideology on CRT results, F(3, 205) = 1.12, p = 0.34, 2 = 0.02. These analyses suggest that,
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contrary to previous research findings, regardless of partisan identity or ideological beliefs,

participants performed similarly on the CRT (M = 1.62, SD = 0.25).

